OpenGov - Open Government Brainstorm

The effort to enhance USG openness is not new. Indeed, as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in his 1998 book "Secrecy": "... secrecy is for losers. For people who don't know how important information really is. The Soviet Union realized this too late. Openness is now a singular, and singularly American, advantage. We put it in peril by poking along in an age now past. It is time to dismantle government secrecy, the most pervasive of Cold-war era regulations. It is time to begin building the supports for the era of openness that is already upon us."

While Moynihan left us a few years ago, American would do well to take his legacy to heart, and to keep his and our great nation's love of openness alive and thriving.

More specifically, in 1997 the US Senate established a Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. This commission was chaired by Senator Moynihan. Its recommendations continue to be outstanding ones that should be fully implemented today. The entire report of this commission is found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html

A summary of this commission's recommendations follow:

1. The Commission recommends enactment of a statute establishing the principles on which

Federal classification and declassification programs are to be based. (p. 13)

2. The Commission recommends that the Security Policy Board (SPB) implement within one year

the Joint Security Commission recommendation on establishing a single set of security standards

for special access programs (SAPs). The SPB, in conjunction with the Department of Defense,

should examine whether the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual Supplement

should continue to allow individual SAP program managers to select the security measures for

their program rather than conform to a single standard. Industrial contractors should be included

in this review and in the development of a single set of standards. (p. 28)

3. The Commission recommends that agencies take several steps to enhance the proficiency of

classifiers and improve their accountability by requiring additional information on the rationale for

classification, by improving classification guidance, and by strengthening training and evaluation

programs.

Elements of this approach should include:

•Original classifiers shall provide a detailed justification for each original classification

decision;

•Derivative classifiers shall be required to identify themselves on the documents

they classify;

•Classification guides shall be better developed, more definitive, and updated

regularly, and industry shall participate in the preparation of guides affecting

industrial programs;

•Training shall be expanded to include derivative classifiers and shall conform to

minimum Executive Branch standards; and

•Proper classification of information shall be included as a critical element in the

performance evaluations of all employees authorized to classify. (p. 34)

4. The Commission recommends that classification decisions, including the establishment of

special access programs, no longer be based solely on damage to the national security. Additional

factors, such as the cost of protection, vulnerability, threat, risk, value of the information, and

public benefit from release, could also be considered when making classification decisions. (p. 38)

5. The Commission recommends that responsibility for classification and declassification policy

development and oversight be assigned to a single Executive Branch body, designated by the

President and independent of the agencies that classify. This entity should have sufficient resources

and be empowered to carry out oversight of agency practices and to develop policy.

Based on its oversight findings, this body would then make recommendations for policy and

implementation of classification and declassification issues directly to the National Security

Council. The Security Policy Board would have an opportunity to comment on these policy

recommendations through the NSC process. (p. 44)

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Appendix C: Summary of Recommendations

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6. The Commission recommends the creation by statute of a central office—a National Declassification

Center—at an existing Federal agency such as the National Archives and Records

Administration to coordinate national declassification policy and activities. This Center would

have the responsibility, authority, and funds sufficient to coordinate, oversee, and implement

government declassification activities. The Center would monitor agency declassification

programs and provide annual reports on their status to the Congress and the President. (p. 68)

7. The Commission recommends that the use of sources and methods as a basis for the

continuing classification of intelligence information be clarified through issuance of an Intelligence

Community directive by the Director of Central Intelligence, explaining the appropriate scope of

that protection. (p. 70)

8. The Commission recommends that agencies better structure their records management and

systematic declassification programs to maximize access to records that are likely to be the

subject of significant public interest.

Elements of this proposal should include:

•Complying with the dates or events for declassification, including through the use

of new technologies;

•Consolidating and regularly updating declassification guidance that is easily

accessible to those authorized to declassify within the agency;

•Prioritizing declassification according to entire record groups selected through

active consultation with the public and outside scholars, and regularly informing

the public of systematic review results;

•Requiring all offices with any declassification-related activities to demonstrate

that they are operating in partnership with others in the agency involved in related

activities; and

•Establishing ombudsman offices in each agency that has original classification

authority or engages in declassifying records: these offices would intervene in

and resolve classification and declassification issues upon request, act as a

conduit for public concerns about access to records, and, where appropriate, refer

issues to the agency’s Inspector General. (p. 71)

9. The Commission recommends five guiding principles as the essential elements of an effective

personnel security system. Most already are part of the current system (including under Executive

Order 12968), but too often they are not actually practiced throughout the Federal Government.

The Commission recommends that these standards be incorporated into a new statute or

regulation that would supersede Executive Order 10450.

The five guiding principles are:

•Openness and clarity of standards;

•Balanced, “whole-person” standards;

•Reciprocity for classified access;

•Nondiscrimination principles; and

•Assurances of due process. (p. 80)

10. The Commission recommends that individuals in both Government and industry holding valid

clearances be able to move from one agency or special program to another without further

Appendix C: Summary of Recommendations

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investigation or adjudication. The single exception to this true reciprocity of security clearances

shall be that agencies may continue to require the polygraph before granting access. (p. 82)

11. The Commission recommends that current requirements for neighborhood interviews and for

interviewing educational references in every investigation be eliminated. (p. 86)

12. The Commission recommends that greater balance be achieved between the initial clearance

process and programs for continuing evaluation of cleared employees. (p. 87)

13. The Commission recommends that both the Congress and the Executive Branch reevaluate

the requirement to utilize a new financial disclosure form and consider staying its implementation

until there is further evaluation concerning how it would be used and whether its benefits exceed

its costs. The Congress and the Executive Branch should review alternative approaches to

improving data collection, including utilization of the expanded access to certain financial and

travel records provided for under Executive Order 12968. (p. 89)

14. The Commission recommends that: (1) the director of scientific research at the Department

of Defense Polygraph Institute establish a committee that includes cleared, outside scientific

experts to develop a coherent research agenda on the polygraph; initiate and participate in a small

grant program to stimulate independent research outside the Government; and review and comment

on scientific progress and the quality of government-sponsored research in this field; and

(2) independent, objective, and peer-reviewed scientific research be encouraged as the best

means to assess the credibility of the polygraph as a personnel security tool and identify potential

technological advances that could make the polygraph more effective in the future. (p. 91)

15. The Commission recommends revising the Computer Security Act of 1987 to reflect the

realities of information systems security in the Information Age.

Some of the changes to the Act might include:

•Moving the Computer Systems Laboratory from the National Institute of Standards

and Technology to a higher visibility position within the Commerce Department,

thereby increasing the likelihood of funding and personnel to support the

civilian side of Government;

•Directing agencies to set aside specific funds, perhaps as a budget line item, for

information systems security training; and

•Requiring the Office of Personnel Management to create a career path for

information systems security professionals that includes network administration

and computer crime investigation. (p. 104)

16. The Commission recommends developing an information systems security career path across

the Government. (p. 111)